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[Abstract] The paper seeks to explain the present high levels of corruption in
the post-communist countries, i.e. the centrally planned economies where the
communist party lost power as the outcome of a specific historical process where
both the character of the former economic system as well as that policy shock itself
played key roles. Among the possible explanatory factors the study focuses on the
effects of production decline and the ‘monetarisation’ of the economy which
started before the policy shock.
Jens Chr. Andvig
A Polanyi Perspective on
Post-Communist Corruption
Introduction0 
The question I will deal with here is the following: How to explain the extensive 
corruption experienced in most countries that once were centrally planned econo-
mies (CPEs) and where the communist parties1 lost power? One approach is based 
on cross-section econometrics and compare the corruption in these countries with 
corruption in other countries looking for a common set of factors that may explain 
the present variation, such as GDP-levels, religion, whether the country in ques-
tion was ruled by British or not, and so on.2 At present I am critical to this 
approach, feeling that it relies on premature generalisation. It is premature when 
we have no good, general theory to explain its variation. Excessive generalisation 
may also lead us to reject genuine, but more historically specific explanations. 
Let us look at our case. Countries where the communist parties broke down 
also experienced strong production declines. The empirical correlation between 
the size of the production decline and the country indicators of corruption is 
striking. Is it a theoretically valid connection? The market expansion in China and 
Vietnam also appears to go together with increasing corruption rates, but then 
with high growth rates. How may a production decline then become part of an 
explanation of higher corruption rates? As noted in Andvig (1991), corruption 
occurs in situations so different that one may not in general expect a given vari-
able to have the same effects. Aggregate corruption is a rather different construct 
than, let us say, than private consumption where we may reasonably assume that 
each consumer faces a similar situation influenced by the same factors, such as 
their own disposable income. Thus, it is not surprising that growth rates of pro-
duction (positive or negative) during market transitions may have different impact 
on aggregate corruption depending on whether the Communist Party has kept 
control or not. Hence, I will stick with production decline as part of the explana-
                                                 
0  I thank Professors Janos Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman for helpful and constructive criticism. I have 
received useful comments by the participants at the first Trust and honesty workshop,Budapest and the 
‘Elster seminar’ in Oslo. My colleague Per Bottolf Maurseth has contributed with many useful comment. 
Eilert Struksnes has corrected some of the worst English mistakes. The Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs has sponsored the research. 
1  In the title I use the term post-communism. I use this term to describe countries where the Communist 
Party once was the key economic power, which it now has lost. Hence, while China and Russia both are 
post-socialist countries, only Russia is post-communist. It is also post-socialist. 
2  A typical work of this kind that focuses on the post-communist countries is Treisman (2002). 
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tion of the variation of corruption levels inside the group of post-communist 
countries. Unlike artificial counterfactual experiments explaining high corruption 
levels such as ‘not being ruled by the British’, declining production levels and its 
variation was something experienced by the agents who chose to engage in cor-
rupt transaction in the post-communist countries.  
In addition to production decline I will focus on what we may call the ‘mone-
tarisation’ process of the socialist economies. Unlike production declines, that was 
a process which has taken place in all post-socialist countries. An essential char-
acteristic of the former socialist countries was that prices and markets played 
minor roles both as means of coordinating economic decisions and as incentives 
motivating economic agents. While not so centrally planned as they were sup-
posed to be, the de facto decentralisation was not achieved through monetary 
means. Multi-purpose money was not essential for the development of an exten-
sive division of labour, as it has been for market economies (Hicks, 1968). The 
socialist economies were in this sense ‘natural’ economies. The issues involved 
when transforming a ‘natural’ economy into a market economy have been a central 
subject for both social science and economic history for long, most often associated 
with the names of Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi. The transformation they considered 
was one of agriculturally based peasant or feudal economies, all decentralised, into 
market-based systems. The issue here is a transformation of a single economic 
bureaucracy with a public ownership structure into a complex of markets and pri-
vate, portioned capitalist ownership structures. Like the historically preceding trans-
formation, both the new and the old order were sustained by differing norm systems. 
The shift in norm systems opened up for some forms of corruption. One important 
difference between the transition from socialism to capitalism and the one from 
‘feudalism’ to capitalism was the immediate feedback effects which the signal of 
system change had on the old order. The swiftness of the response was in this case 
related to the highly centralised character of the old order’s production system. The 
most striking feedback effect was the bureaucracy responding with a production 
decline. 
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As just mentioned, an important characteristic of both kinds of transitions, has 
been the ‘monetarisation’ of the economy, a somewhat vague, but nevertheless 
important process. In the terms of Polanyi, as a consequence of the transition to a 
market economy the ‘special-purpose money’ of the socialist economies would 
have to change to the ‘all-purpose money’ of the capitalist market economies.3  
Hence, it may not be so surprising that a number of issues that arose in the 
transformation of peasant or ‘feudal’ economies into capitalist market economies 
have reappeared in the transition from socialism. Old analyses of Marx and 
Polanyi have present relevance for reasons they may not have imagined, a rele-
vance they hardly would have hoped for. 
Before the transition, corruption was apparently stimulated by the growth in 
irregular or illegal markets. That is not so surprising. The widening of the number 
of such markets increased the number of goods and services money could buy. 
What is more surprising is that the later legalisation of a large number of market 
processes did not bring corruption rates down. During the transition the incidence 
of corruption even appears positively related to the legal expansion of market 
forces. That also happened in the countries where the communist party kept con-
trol, such as in China and Vietnam. 
In the first part I outline some of mechanisms shared when markets expanded 
in the socialist countries with and without communist party breakdowns. Mainly 
observations from the Soviet Union before and after the party breakdown will be 
used, however. I indicate how both legal and illegal expansion of regular markets 
contributed to increase both the corruption and the need for more powerful moni-
toring mechanisms. While the last challenge was partly met in China, in the 
Soviet Union it was not. In fact, the market expansion nexus might have been one 
                                                 
3  The term ‘all-purpose’ is, of course, an exaggeration. If we have money at the left side and a complete list 
of goods and services deliverable in a society on the right side, no society would allow money to buy 
every item on the list. The length of the list of items which money may buy determines the 
exchangeability of money. Even with respect to market economies the lengths of that list may vary 
considerably. Regular corruption extends the list. For shortness I often call this money ‘cash’, although in 
most case cash refers to bank deposits where the owner is not subject to extensive restrictions. 
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of the major mechanisms trigging the party breakdown. Since party breakdown is 
only an exogenous fact in the study, no separate analysis of it is made.4  
As emphasised by Kornai ( Kornai 1992:361) the communist party and its ide-
ology is the key to understand the workings of the centrally planned economies 
(the CPEs). Whether the communist party of a country broke down or not, was the 
crucial determining factor in staking out the different paths of corruption that fol-
lowed in the wake of their market expansions.  
Here I also stick to a Polyanyi perspective in the methodological sense by 
regarding present levels of corruption in the post-communist countries as the out-
come of a particular historical process, restraining the possible counterfactual 
experiments to be allowed as explanations5. 
Corruption as market intrusion into the spheres of hierarchy and polity 
Regard the following definitions of corruption and embezzlement (Andvig, 1995): 
 
An act is corrupt if a member of an organisation uses his/her position, 
his/her rights to make decisions, access to information, or some other of the 
resources of the organisation, to the advantage of a third party and thereby 
receives money or other economically valuable goods or services in ways 
that either are illegal or against the organisation's own aims or rules. An act 
represents embezzlement if a member of an organisation uses his/her rights 
to make decisions, access to information or some of the other resources of 
the organisation to his/her own economic advantage, eventually to the 
advantage of some other members of the organisation, in ways that are either 
illegal or against the organisation's own aims or rules. 
 
Corruption then implies that a person outside the organisation in question buys a 
certain favour (which may be to refrain from illegal punishment) from an insider 
                                                 
4  For an interesting and extensively research study of the breakdown of one monitoring organisation in the 
former Soviet Union, the Komsomol, see Solnick (1998). His study traces an extraordinary important 
monetarisation of key political organisations of the old order..  
5  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) apparently agree with many of our conclusions when they are insisting that 
centralised corruption (such as the one that existed in the communist countries before the party 
breakdowns) is less harmful to growth than decentralised corruption, which a state breakdown will easily 
lead to. Their modelling, as Harrison and Kim (2002) point out, does not give scope for the peculiarities 
of the planned economies. Moreover in some post-communist countries, such as Azerbaijan, corruption 
became quite centralised after 1993 while its production decline was among the heaviest, and corruption 
appears to be at least as harmful as the one where it became more decentralised. Being a set of static 
models, there is no mechanism in them which leads from the monopolised to decentralised corruption. 
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who sells it, i.e. regular, repetitive corruption implies that the set of market trans-
actions expands illegally into the fields of bureaucratic and political decisions. 
Embezzlement does not, however, imply market expansion, but it too represents a 
misuse of a formal position for private gain, is stimulated by any weakening of an 
organisation’s monitoring apparatus and is also in other ways likely to be stimu-
lated by many of the same set of circumstances as corruption. Because of the 
importance of privatisation during the transition embezzlement has proved as 
important as corruption in several of the post-communist countries, as it certainly 
has been in Russia. Since embezzlement may be performed by a single member it 
is often easier to perform, hence it is also likely to be more frequent in low cor-
ruption environments. 
The notion of corruption indicates that agents uphold norms about the ways 
transactions between agents should be performed. Most societies seem to have a 
limited number of such norms about transactional modes and the meta-norms for 
determining the situations of which they may apply. In particular, transactions 
which are stipulated to be task-oriented, loyalty-oriented or rule-bound, i.e. 
bureaucratic transactions, should not be performed in the market mode. Task-ori-
ented transactions are transactions where the immediate motivation of the indi-
viduals involved is simply to solve the task. To be able to solve the task becomes 
its own incentive. 
Large-scale changes in economic systems normally imply large changes in the 
fields of application for these various micro-coordination devices both from a 
normative and a factual point of view. For example, one of the key characteristics 
of the socialist societies compared to present OECD countries was that their nor-
mative grids allowed a much smaller space for market transactions.  
Traditional socialism and corruption: Hard bureaucratic and soft mar-
ket incentives 
A well-known characteristic of a CPE was that the whole economy was organised 
as one public bureaucracy. Unlike most bureaucracies, the main thing shuffled 
across offices (enterprises) was not messages, but real goods and services. Like in 
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any standard bureaucracy there were no hard price charges as long as the move-
ment of goods and services was internal to it. The prices attached were mainly 
accounting devices useful for reporting, but not so important for behaviour. Only 
the goods leaving the bureaucracy for private consumers were paid in cash, while 
bonuses and wage expenses were the only items paid out in cash. 
At the higher levels the central problem was to coordinate the various offices 
so that their plans for delivery and acquirement meshed. In order to do so, the 
specification of the transaction technology, which office to communicate with 
whom about what, was exceptionally important so that the higher levels were not 
overwhelmed with information. In theory the economy was coordinated by a pro-
duction and delivery plan. 
In practice the old planned economy was more like a kind of multilateral bar-
tering system where the subordinate offices had to do much of the searching 
themselves. The coordinating sectors, while not dealing in planning in the strict 
sense, nevertheless had an important role to play by actively reducing the large 
search costs involved. Unlike regular market economies, most of the search costs 
had to be shouldered by the acquiring, not the delivering agents. Prices, fixed by 
the government for long periods, played only a minor role in coordination, mainly 
because budgets were not decentralised. The output prices did not constitute a 
basis for income to be spent, only income in the books.  
This does not mean that the offices (enterprises) were completely uninterested 
in their prices. Higher (accounting) prices implied in most cases an easier life 
either because that eased plan-fulfilling directly, or because increased prices 
would increase the value of the bank accounts of the office, which it somehow 
might get access to (granted the necessary permissions). Such prospects even 
increased the ease by which it might get access to inputs outside the regular 
channels6. Regarded as economic incentives, prices were soft, however. Profits 
                                                 
6  Harrison and Kim (2002) present an analysis of how enterprises exploited the fact that the binding output 
plans had to be so aggregated that they never were fixed in physical output terms, but in value terms. 
Accounting prices were needed for that aggregation. Given this situation, they convincingly argue 
(against Shleifer and Vishny (1992)) that the enterprises were always interested in ‘high’, not ‘low’ 
prices, and that they had some scope for influencing the actual delivery prices. In the model they study 
the interaction between accounting prices, the actual delivery prices, production levels and, eventually, 
corruption under the old regime. However, they don’t focus on the situation when the prices carry income 
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were a somewhat stronger incentive, particularly when bonus payments were tied 
to profit targets, but still soft. To make a large positive profit made life easier, but 
after a while it would be taxed away. Negative profits were undesirable, but did 
not threaten survival. While high taxes were negative seen from an enterprise’s 
point of view, it made not much sense to invest much effort in avoiding them, 
since the enterprise had little alternative use of the profits. Tax incentives were 
also soft. 
The hard incentives were bureaucratic. In the short run the strongest was 
simply the task-oriented plan fulfilment. If you did not fulfil the plan, you brought 
your superior and sometimes also your workers into trouble. A large part of your 
own income hinged upon plan fulfilment through bonuses (often 60–90%, 
Conyngham 1982: 19). The analytical discussion of the operation of the Soviet 
incentive system has accordingly focused on bonus maximisation and the so-called 
ratchet effect. The choice of plan indicators to tie the bonus to changed constantly, 
particularly since the mid 1960s. A major point was, however, that bonuses were 
awarded according to some indicator of plan fulfilment, not absolute achievement, 
such as realised levels of production. If the enterprise/offices over-fulfilled the plan, 
the plan was adjusted upwards next year. This implied that the officials would try to 
supply as little output, and demand as much input, as possible. The passive bonus 
maximisation behaviour with the ratchet effect was a go-slow equilibrium where 
either the probability of promotion was low or promotion was based on this same 
passive plan fulfilment. Here it never paid to be a hard-working enterprise. 
Naturally, when generalised, most sectors would then experience excess ‘demand’.  
Even in this situation to assume bonus maximisation behaviour could be mis-
leading. The bonus actually received was always in part influenced by informal 
considerations. Readjustments of plans were continuously made. It was well rec-
ognised that strict application of any given bonus criteria would always give rise 
to abnormities. 
                                                 
generating tasks (Johansen, 1978: 57) and how that fact change both the incentives and possibilities for 
making corrupt transactions, the main theme here. 
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Moreover, both expected bonus and the expected nature of task-solving would 
hinge upon the position occupied. The short-run bureaucratic incentives of task-
solving and bonus maximisation would be embedded in the even harder bureau-
cratic incentives of career strivings.7 Since the capitalist road was closed, moving 
up the hierarchical ladder was the major path to become (modestly) rich.. Corre-
sponding to the fear of losing wealth was here the ever-ruling fear of losing your 
position.  
The mechanisms for promotion, the hiring and firing, were also important from 
a coordination point of view, since they represented an enormous saving of infor-
mational costs of steering. Although management positions in countries like the 
Soviet Union were numerous, the number of significant economic choices that in 
theory should be coordinated through an explicit plan was by far much higher, 
since each person had some kind of structure making his actions auto-correlated 
from the leadership's point of view.8 It was much easier to control individuals 
through personnel policies than to control all their actions through extensive for-
mal control systems tied to output deliveries.  
This explains why the nomenklatura system became so important in the cen-
trally planned economies, why the communist party's control of hiring policies 
was so important. The communist parties functioned as capital ‘markets’ of the 
socialist economies by shifting the leadership teams of the enterprises By a further 
analogy to a stock exchange – it was through their exercise of this function that 
the communist parties became the effective owners of their countries’ capital 
stocks. 
The lever of personnel policies meant that that the stagnant effects of the 
ratchet games could at times be partly overcome. Nothing hindered the communist 
                                                 
7  Granick (1980) claimed that the enterprises in the Soviet Union should not be considered as any 
maximising unit at all. The ministry should, since that was the lowest unit where plan targets were 
normally kept constant during a year. His data for the period 1969-77 show indications of a shift from 
‘taut’ planning in the preceding period to a softer strategy. 
8  The novel The Appointment by A. Bek gives an example from the Stalin period. The extremely righteous 
manager O. discovers that A. is illegally (it is World War II) bringing some butter back home, which is 
only allowed to be eaten in the canteen, but A. refuses to tell why he did so and O. fires him in public. 
Afterwards O. discovers that A. had been asked by O.’s wife to carry the butter out of the canteen for the 
benefit of O.’s child. Since then O. brings A. with him to new positions on the assumption that A.’s 
display of loyalty will carry over in the new positions. The same applies, of course, with other 
bureaucratic virtues such as being hard-working.  
A Polanyi Perspective on Post-Communist Corruption 11 
party watching the actual growth of enterprises and its promoting successful man-
agers to unlock the bottlenecks created by the stagnant ratchet games. When a suf-
ficient number of offices realised that hard efforts were the key to promotion, the 
economy could move into a fast equilibrium. To play the stagnant ratchet game 
could then even prove dangerous for your health as it happened frequently in the 
Stalin period.. Note that even in the fast equilibrium excess demand and shortages 
were likely to arise since the promotion drives did not only work on the A rough 
indication of the economic role of the promotion policies of the communist party 
is growth rates. Economic growth rates of the Stalin era were generally high. The 
Stalin bureaucracy was newly established and fast growing (i.e. job openings were 
many and the likelihood of promotion high). While all the killings of the period 
created fear and destruction of manpower, they also renewed promotion possibili-
ties. When the system was introduced to several new countries in Eastern Europe 
in the early post-World War II years, growth rates were also high and promotions 
frequent. While other factors clearly were also working, it is a striking fact that 
economic growth during the Brezhnev era declined as the promotional mobility 
decreased. 9  
Unlike the state economic organisations of the CPE countries, which were built 
on functional lines, the communist parties were based on geographical subunits, 
each with a large number of cross-sector responsibilities. From a corruption point 
of view it is important to note that the Party was not supposed to be much 
involved in day-to-day operations. It was organised formally as outside the state 
apparatus. In addition to its nomenklatura function it was also responsible for a 
general political and economic monitoring of the various institutions within its 
area of responsibility.10 It had therefore a right to get involved at different 
                                                 
 9  Downs (1967) made a brief application of his notion of rigidity cycles to the Soviet Union (which is somewhat 
similar to our explanation), and predicted a slow-down before the real slow-down of economic growth had 
taken place. Documentation on high plant manager turnover from the Stalin period is in Berliner (1952). 
Public recognition of a considerable slow-down in turnover is documented at least from the mid 1970s 
(Conyngham 1982: 17). The fragility in the workings of the Soviet economic bureaucracy has also been noted 
in Harrison (2001). 
10  The party monitoring of large economic units located in a particular geographical subunit was normally 
the responsibility of the party leadership of a larger geographical unit; in the case of the largest 
enterprises the Party at the national level. The party leadership inside an institution was in general partly 
subordinated to the CEO of the institution, and partly to the local party leadership. The last tie was the 
stronger one, a party insider often acted more like an informer who would send information about the 
CEO of the enterprise to the party nomenklatura employing network. 
Jens Chr. Andvig 12 
hierarchical levels of the state organisations. The Party itself was monitored by 
separate monitoring organisations like the KGB. Although monitored, the Party 
remained the key power-holder, probably directly and indirectly linked to its 
employment function. It was these structural features, growing from the Party’s 
role as the ultimate power-holder, which allowed it to establish local networks of 
personalised information gathering and to function as a capital market. 
How exposed to corruption were the CPEs, what was the extent of corruption 
and its major forms? I find it useful to distinguish between corruption internal to 
the economic bureaucracy and corruption at its borderline, where it met the citi-
zen-consumer, i.e., areas of activity where cash transactions were common. Let us 
first look at the internal corruption. 
In the high-speed equilibrium the tautness of plans ‘forced’ the managers to 
break rules in order to achieve plan fulfilment. Since one would experience excess 
demand whether the bureaucracy was playing slow ratchet games or followed the 
hard Stalin promotion rules, it would be the ‘buyer’ who would have the incentive 
to bribe, not the seller like in a capitalist market economy. So one step to obey the 
plan could be to bribe an input supplier. In most cases the method used was not 
corruption in the strict sense, but rather pulling strings of influence of a more per-
sonal or political nature, blat. Furthermore, the formal breach of the plan was 
more often than not made in order to fulfil the aim of the organisation, not to fur-
ther the private interests of the involved parties11. 
A major mechanism for containing corruption of the internal kind, was the 
non-monetised way of allocating of goods across enterprises. The income 
received by a supplying firm could not be spent at will, but showed up only in its 
ledgers at the mono-bank. The share of ‘cash’ that an enterprise could hide away 
from its planned wage and bonus allocation was not sufficient to buy significant 
amount of inputs (i.e. bribes). Instead, one had to rely on the channels of influence 
mentioned easing illegal or semi-legal multilateral barter deals. Particularly for 
the input-producing parts of the economy, the transaction costs for completing 
                                                 
11  Harrison and Kim (2002) have modelled this situation. In their model they show that in general more 
corruption is to be expected in the less harsh equilibrium. 
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corrupt deals were so high and the expected private gain from bribing was so low 
that the evolution of large-scale commercially motivated corruption was to a large 
extent contained (Andvig, 1985). While planning could sustain a complex division 
of labour, by not being monetised, it was difficult to achieve that double coinci-
dence of wants necessary to complete a purely corrupt transaction. It was con-
stantly sought achieved, however, through a combination of bending some rules to 
get initial access to some real, scarce goods and looking for people who might be 
able to have use for them.  
It was of course not impossible for agents with large cross-sector networks – 
party officials were here often in good positions – to complete longer strings of 
barter deals often necessary to complete successful corrupt transactions. Informal 
norms supporting long-lasting obligations of a ‘debtor’ of a favour to eventually 
close his open-ended credit positions by a return favour also increased the scope 
for internal corrupt deals (Ledeneva 1998). Nevertheless, the lack of, or rather the 
strict control of cash in the socialist economy acted as a brake on the expansion of 
corrupt deals.  
The obvious implication is that any increase in the scope of monetary circula-
tion, any rise of markets in the producer goods industries should also tend to 
increase the incidence of internal corruption. The Polanyi perspective becomes 
visible: The growth of market forces on the basis of a ’natural’ economy would 
have important feedbacks on the old order..  
At the borders of the socialist administration cash was in use and transaction 
costs much lower. Since shortages and excess demand situations also ruled the 
consumer goods markets, but their prices were determined in the plan, paying 
shops under the counter for getting better quality goods, getting ahead in a queue 
or simply to get access to a scarce good was common. Given the rules and norms 
of a socialist society, this was corruption. Disregarding situations of rationing, 
seen from the point of view of a market economy, this was morally rather harm-
less activities and would hardly be counted as corruption.  
Other public officials, not being shop employees, but who were meeting the 
public could also make corrupt deals with low transaction costs: Doctors, police-
Jens Chr. Andvig 14 
men, judges, teachers, policemen, university professors, and so on. Given the 
severity of the penal system, it was not surprising that corruption in the courts and 
among the police has been considered to have been a major problem in the Soviet 
Union.  
While embezzlement was taking place at the enterprises both internal to and at 
the edges of the bureaucracy, in general the incentives to embezzlement were also 
stronger at the edges since these were easier to either barter or sell. However, 
some inputs where tempting to embezzle everywhere, such as gasoline. The 
incentives for getting cash allowance for non-existent workers, the ‘Dead Souls’ 
of socialism, while not easy, were equally strong everywhere.  
The Soviet road to reform: The softening of bureaucratic and  
the hardening of market incentives  
Corruption increased in the Soviet Union the last two decades or so of its exis-
tence, most observers agree. However, we have to careful before we draw any 
conclusion about the underlying reality on the basis of these perceived increases. 
As pointed out by Holmes (1993: 4–5), in the early 1980s a large number of anti-
corruption campaigns were taking place in a number of socialist countries. The 
underlying reason was probably a belief that corruption itself had become more 
severe. However, the fact of the campaigns increased the public’s awareness of 
corruption as an issue. The same did the fact that several leading politicians in the 
Soviet Union climbed up the ladder of the communist party as corruption fighters 
(Andropov, Shevardnadze, Heydar Aliev) and major power struggles, such as the 
Brezhnev succession, were fought around corruption accusations (Clark, 1993, 
145–201). The public’s perception of an increasing rate of corruption was 
unavoidable. 
In this case I believe it was rooted in facts. Since no indexes of corruption were 
available at the time, evidence has to be sought in roundabout ways: Judgments 
about the likely effects of changes in economic policies or in the political and 
economic structure on corruption; observations of other variables linked to cor-
ruption, particularly the size of the second economy; the number of newspaper 
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stories about corruption (Holmes 1993: 137) or the number of people convicted 
for economic crime including corruption (Clark 1993: 87). Many stories of more 
or less anecdotal kind support this impression. Of particular importance are the 
stories of large-scale corruption such as the famous Uzbek cotton scam, since it is 
almost prohibitively difficult to organise a large number of people in a network of 
corrupt transactions in low-corruption surroundings. Thus, a single story may 
have strong implications for the quantitative assessment of the situation. 
How could corruption increase in the centrally planned economy at the time of 
Brezhnev? Was it related to the softening of the bureaucratic regime, the reduced 
tautness of plans or rather in the expansion of market forces? Or maybe mainly 
through the interaction of these two developments? If so, how? Let us first look at 
the internal corruption. Here the softening of bureaucratic incentives that followed 
in the wake of less stringent monitoring was crucial. We have mentioned that the 
plans became less taut, punishment of unsuccessful managers became less harsh, 
the pressure from bureaucratic customers less insistent, since they themselves 
were under less pressure. This made it easier to set aside unused inputs, to develop 
spare capacity and play the ratchet game successfully. Note, however, that the 
bureaucratic incentives for having spare capacity were still limited as the enter-
prises had no control of their intra-planning income, nor were they able to sell the 
unregistered output outside the plan in large quantities. During the Brezhnev 
period no real decentralisation of income spending decisions at the enterprise 
level took place. The expansion of market forces was mainly taking place outside 
the official economy.  
Being outside the legal economic apparatus, buying and selling in black or grey 
markets were clearly illegal, but not necessarily corruption. Consider the example 
of a state farm keeping aside a considerable amount of its wheat harvest to make 
vodka, selling it illegally in a local market. The supply of that vodka would repre-
sent embezzlement. In order to get away with it, however, the state farm would 
have to engage in borderline corruption, bribe the local police, party authorities, 
and so on. If middlemen were needed for its distribution, they would have to do 
the same. A lax plan might be sufficient for making that embezzlement possible. 
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This farm would now have a much stronger incentive for not revealing its capac-
ity than the former desire for easy life. It had a clear incentive to try to bribe the 
plan authorities to get more slack, and the sale of illegal vodka gave the farm the 
means to do it without great transaction costs, i.e., internal corruption was stimu-
lated. The impulse to corruption may spread inwards from the border: The farm 
may need new equipment for making vodka, and order it from a boiler-maker. 
This delivery should better be kept outside the plan, i.e., the boiler-making enter-
prise also got a stronger incentive for hiding capacity. The boiler-maker can be 
paid in cash, and had now instruments for paying bribes further back, if needed. 
The increase in the second, market economy has now also stimulated internal 
corruption. That corruption tended to decrease the output delivered in the planning 
channels and to increase the supply to the second economy. The influx of harder 
economic incentives at the enterprise levels increased the strains on the monitor-
ing apparatus both directly through corruption and indirectly by giving the enter-
prises stronger incentives for hiding capacity.  
While the increase in corruption is not well documented, the expansion of 
black or grey markets is. A clear quantitative indication of the increasing size of 
the second economy is presented in Treml and Alexeev (1993). They show that 
the statistical correlation between official income and savings, and income and the 
registered sale of important consumer goods weakened strongly in the period 
between 1965 and the late 1980s (even for alcohol). A reasonable interpretation of 
these facts is that a larger share of both the households’ income and consumption 
originated from unofficial sources. By looking at the geographical distribution of 
the size of the second economy and the rough indicators of corruption we also 
note a rough positive co-variation:12  
 
                                                 
12  Note that the estimates of the second economy apply assumptions that force some artificial equality 
across some areas. The ‘control of corruption variable’ is an aggregation of corruption indexes made by a 
number of organisations, the aggregation performed by World Bank researchers (Kaufmann et al. 2002). 
It mainly reflects the perception of corruption held by businessmen and experts. The post-breakdown 
observations of corruption are included here partly from a belief that there will be some persistence in 
corruption and second economy levels across the regime change.  
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Table 1. Corruption and second economy. Estimates before and after the transition 
in some former Soviet Union countries  
 
 
Conviction rates 
per million popu-
lation 1965–1990 
Control of cor-
ruption 1997/98 
Unofficial economy 
share 1979 (%) 
Unofficial eco-
nomy share 1995 
(%) 
     
Country     
     
Armenia 7.27 -0.80 … ... 
Azerbaijan  21.85 -1.00 50 70 
Belarus 0.20 -0.65 43 35 
Estonia 2.14 0.59 22 22 
Georgia 15.00 -0.74 50 71 
Kazakhstan 1.21 -0.87 50 50 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 3.85 -0.76 … … 
Latvia 0.00 -0.26 34 41 
Lithuania 1.41 0.03 34 31 
Moldova 4.63 -0.39 43 48 
Russia 2.81 -0.62 27 46 
Tajikistan 2.00 -1.32 … … 
Turkmenistan 4.06 -1.29 … … 
Ukraine 1.70 -0.89 38 57 
Uzbekistan 2.71 -0.96 50 29 
 
Sources: Clark, (1993, Table 3.5), Kaufmann et al. (2002, Table2), Alexeev & Pyle (2001, Table 
5-6). 
 
It confirms the time series observations of a simultaneous rise in corruption fre-
quency (more published corruption stories) and the size of the second economy 
since the mid 1960s.  
What about the role of the communist party in the growth in the corruption and 
the second economy during the low-activity equilibrium? Regarding the internal 
corruption and the communist party’s general monitoring role, the effects appear 
uncertain. At the one hand, the possibility of skimming off money when arranging 
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multilateral barter deals would increase with increased injections of uncontrolled 
money; on the other hand, the enterprises’ increased holdings of such money 
should make less need for the complex multilateral barter deals corrupt, but 
loyal13 party officials were in a unique position to make.  
With respect to borderline corruption, however, there can be no doubt. Allied 
with purely information gathering institutions like the KGB or local policing 
units, communist party leaders could here cash in on their monitoring role. Con-
siderable local returns to scale were present, so the corrupt income opportunities 
in areas with high incidence of second economy activities such as Azerbaijan or 
Georgia, also opened up possibilities for large-scale Party corruption. Borderline 
corruption could make some communist party members rich. 
Regarding the other main activity, the nomenklatura employment function, the 
effects were probably even more uneven, and threshold effects were likely. By 
itself the stagnating mobility of the Brezhnev period should reduce the value of 
the employment function, but reduce the transaction costs of employing it. In the 
Stalin era the value of promotion (or the value of avoiding a death sentence or a 
prison camp) would evidently have been high, but the ability of potential manag-
ers to pay up front for a promotion would be very limited, given the cash control, 
so Party members’ ability to generate bribes on the basis of their employment 
function was probably modest. However, a lowering of pressure without cash 
injections should reduce it even further.  
With the expansion of an illegal, second economy, and less stringent cash 
limitations, that would change. When our vodka-producing state farm manager 
became rich, his nomenklatura board would realise the value of the position. Then 
the position could be auctioned. Adding the value of such auctions to the stream 
of bribes related to the general local monitoring, local Party leadership positions 
may become quite lucrative, indeed. The communist party’s potential role as a 
capital market in fact became visible in the regions of USSR with high second 
economy rates. It even became two-tiered: According to Simis (1982: 36), at least 
                                                 
13  Loyal here means that the party officials sanctioned the breaking of rules, including the rise of stocks of 
unauthorised stocks in cash in the hands of the enterprises in order to make them better able to fulfil the 
plan, not in order to fill their own private pockets. 
A Polanyi Perspective on Post-Communist Corruption 19 
from the early 1970s there were fairly open auction sales of ministerial posts in 
Georgia and Azerbaijan with separate prices for access to the bidding process 
(nomination) and the actual position itself. In the first tier state leadership posi-
tions could be bought and sold, in the second one, the access to the positions 
where leadership positions could be sold became themselves open for sale. This 
is, of course, only a stylised description. The actual outcomes were determined by 
a mix of bid size, clan membership and communist party politics.  
One way to avoid the illegal expansion of the second economy with its effects 
on corruption was to legalise it. However, the intensified incentive to hide did not 
disappear when the enterprise could sell part of its product legally on a market, as 
it happened in China and, copying China, the Soviet Union after 1987. The 
increase in scope for the market mechanism at the enterprise level not only 
increased the demand on monitoring of production planning, but also the demand 
on tax authorities and price-fixing authorities. The Chinese party managed to 
handle the strain on its monitoring, although the creation of a parallel market and 
planned economy created considerable corruption in the Chinese case too. In the 
Soviet Union the bureaucracy was already weakened, the monitor-demanding 
decentralisation of income of the 1987 reform created serious problems and was 
not fully implemented. The Party’s ability to monitor was further weakened in 
1990 when managers were supposed to be elected by an enterprise council instead 
(Jeffries 1993: 54). The communist party thereby scrapped its key lever, the 
power to employ the managers.  
Political breakdown, monetarisation and corruption  
One year after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had yielded its nomenk-
latura rights, it lost its state-holding powers, as had happened with the other state-
holding communist parties in Europe before. By then it became clear that the area 
economically would be ruled by market-based organisations. The speed, exact 
scope and organisational patterns were not settled, but that the scope for market 
transactions should expand, was clear. The scope for hard economic incentives 
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and cash money would increase in a setting where the public monitoring capabili-
ties were shrinking.  
As soon as the enterprises were allowed access to markets on a larger scale, 
their casual attitudes to prices and taxes did change drastically. The switch from 
soft to hard prices (first partly illegal) which followed the partial price liberalisa-
tion made it difficult for both the workers of the enterprise and the weakened 
communist party to prevent the transfer of enterprises’ new, hard income into the 
managers’ private accounts.14 From the flow side each enterprise tried to keep its 
expenses in soft prices and its income in hard. Deregulation of foreign trade meant 
that income from exports became exceptionally attractive. Strangely, some 
expense that had been hard before, such as wages become soft for a while, proba-
bly reflecting the changing power structures. 
The emerging income-earning aspect of prices released a cost-push inflation 
mechanism since the enterprises now had gotten a strong interest in the prices of 
their products, were allowed to fix them (in Russia from 1992, after the price lib-
eralisation) and many were in position to increase them. To some extent the cost-
push mechanism could be self-sustaining, but it was in fact working together with 
the large monetary overhang of the Soviet Union at the point of the breakdown.  
How large the money stock was at any given time, is a rather complicated 
matter to decide, due to the stock aspect of the monetarisation; the gradual lifting 
of restrictions on various bank deposits, increasing their liquidity. It stimulated 
extensive efforts to shift the inter-enterprise credit and debt positions: Each enter-
prise would try to keep its debts soft and credits hard. The resulting patchwork of 
hard and soft positions, soft and hard debts, strongly stimulated enterprises to 
compete through bribes in making authorities sanction desirable shifts in the 
hardness degree of the debts and credits. Enterprises (or organisations) that 
received early access to hard credits, such as an early lifting of restrictions on 
bank deposits, could gain a decisive advantage. Several of the largest private 
banks in Russia grew from the lifting of the restrictions on Komsomol’s assets 
                                                 
14  Before the privatisation of the enterprises, this kind of behaviour was clearly a case of embezzlement. 
Since then, it may be considered as a way of defrauding minority owners according to the new rules of 
the game.  
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(Solnick 1998: 119). The strong shift in relative prices that was also part of the 
outcome of the combined lift of price and income disposal restrictions, contrib-
uted strongly to the overall production decline that took place in the later stages of 
the transition.15 
The monetarisation of taxes had immediate impact on corruption rates. The 
traditional tax-collecting apparatus was geared to a situation where the incentives 
of tax avoidance were weak. That changed dramatically when the taxes to be col-
lected were supposed to be in hard money. The amount collected plunged. The 
enterprises now had strong incentives not only for tax avoidance, but for bribing 
tax officials, which they did on a large scale. This caused a further tax decline, 
and an immediate rise in the overall corruption rates. Softening the impact of 
monetarisation, some tax debts were kept soft for a while. In addition, many 
enterprises moved into the informal economy in order to avoid taxes altogether. 
This reduced taxes further and was also likely to increase the corruption rate. In 
most cases it was necessary to bribe at numerous points of the public administra-
tion to survive as an informal enterprise.  
The effects of monetarisation on aggregate tax collection were reinforced by 
the production decline, reducing the tax base further. The spillover effects from 
corruption in the tax collection authorities to the other public sectors were strong, 
since the need for most public services were unchanged or rather increasing. One 
result was an income squeeze which made the single public employee responsible 
for collecting his own private taxes or sell his services piece-rate, i.e., to extort or 
bribe. Azerbaijan was an extreme case. While in 1992 public budget revenue con-
stituted 61.5% of GDP, in 1997 it was only 17.4% .16  
                                                 
15  The effects of the whole disorganisation, including the strong price shifts, on production levels have been 
nicely analysed in Blanchard and Kremer (1997). Some of the production decline was halted by the rise 
of the clusters of multilateral bartering clusters. According to the new set of relative prices many of the 
enterprises which would have a positive (accounting) profits, could now only operate with negative 
profits, and would have to close if all prices remained hard. However, clusters of such enterprises were 
able to survive when some of the inputs received were charged only in soft prices. From a Polanyi point 
of view they could be considered as attempts by the producers to withdraw from new market forces, in 
order to survive, to protect the old ‘natural’ economy. Unlike former-day peasants Soviet workers could 
not to do on an individual basis, however. Clusters of enterprises were needed. Their effects on the 
average corruption rate are uncertain and rely heavily on the counterfactual to be specified. 
16  Andvig (1999: 42). The experiences of the different post-communist countries with respect to tax 
collection were very different, however. In some taxes have increased. The preceding discussion on 
monetarisation applies most directly to the area of the former Soviet Union, which had had less 
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Production decline, political shocks and corruption 
The most dramatic and visible expression of the breakdown in the control of the 
communist parties was the decline in production. Since production was organised 
through the all-embracing bureaucracy, where the outcome of each office’s effort 
hinged upon the effort of the others, that was to be expected. Bureaucrats were in 
fact told that their employer (monitor) was gone, together with the bureaucratic 
rewards, such as the prospects of promotion. Any relation between enterprise 
effort levels and individual economic rewards had become highly uncertain and 
difficult to predict. Neither is it surprising that the disappearance of the estab-
lished monitoring apparatus also encouraged corruption. 
An indication of the strength of the corruption – production-fall connection is 
presented in Table 2. 
                                                 
interaction with market economies and where the planned economy was more extensive than any of the 
smaller member countries of COMECON. 
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Table 2. GDP, corruption and production decline in post-communist countries  
 
Sources: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón(2002), Fischer and Sahay (2000) 
 
We present two additional (to Table 1) corruption indicators. The capture variable 
gives the percentage of firms involved in corruption at higher levels. The bribe 
variable is self-explaining. It is evident from Table 2 that the initial production 
decline in the post-communist countries was a spectacular historical event. The 
Country 
Cumul-ative 
output decline 
to lowest level 
(1989 = 1000) 
Govern-
ment 
effecti-ve-
ness, 
1997/98 
Govern-
ment 
effective-
ness 
2000/2001 
Control of 
cor-ruption 
1997/98 
Control of 
cor-ruption 
2000/01 
Capture 
econ-omy  
index 
Admin-stra-
tive corrup-
tion % of 
revenues of 
all firms 
Albania 399 -0.65 -0.89 -0.99 -0.60 16 4.0
Armenia 651 -0.65 -1.03 -0.80 -0.80 7 4.6
Azerbaijan  631 -0.83 -0.95 -1.00 -1.05 41 5.7
Belarus 369 -0.66 -0.99 -0.65 -0.06 8 1.3
Bulgaria 368 -0.81 -0.26 -0.56 -0.16 28 2.1
Croatia 377 0.15 0.10 -0.46 -0.02 27 1.1
Czech Republic 154 0.59 0.58 0.38 0.31 11 2.5
Estonia 364 0.26 0.86 0.59 0.73 10 1.6
Georgia 746 -0.51 -0.72 -0.74 -0.69 24 4.3
Hungary 181 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.65 7 1.7
Kazakhstan 400 -0.82 -0.61 -0.87 -0.83 12 3.1
Kyrgyz Republic 504 -0.58 -0.61 -0.76 -0.85 29 5.3
Latvia 528 0.07 0.22 -0.26 -0.03 30 1.4
Lithuania 408 0.13 0.26 0.03 0.20 11 2.8
Macedonia, FYR 466 -0.58 -0.63 -0.52 -0.51 … …
Moldovia 663 -0.46 -1.10 -0.39 -0.83 37 4.0
Poland 136 0.67 0.27 0.49 0.43 12 1.6
Romania 267 -0.57 -0.54 -0.46 -0.51 21 3.2
Russia 451 -0.59 -0.57 -0.62 -1.01 32 2.8
Slovak Republic 247 -0.03 0.23 0.03 0.23 24 2.5
Slovenia 204 0.57 0.70 1.02 1.09 7 1.4
Tajikstan 740 -1.42 -1.31 -1.32 -1.08 … …
Turkmenistan 595 -1.25 -1.23 -1.29 -1.12 … …
Ukraine 638 -0.89 -0.75 -0.89 -0.90 32 4.4
Uzbekistan 144 -1.30 -0.86 -0.96 -0.66 6 4.4
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average production decline in the area which now constitutes 25 countries was 
above 40%, greater than even the great depression of the 1930s. 17 
Some of this co-variation must have been produced by the policy shock itself, by 
its weakening of the monitoring mechanisms and its sudden destruction of pro-
motional capital. Corruption and production decline become two indicators of the 
strength of the same policy shock. A statistical exploration of the relationship 
shows that both the GDP level (negative) and the rate of production decline (posi-
tive) had strong, statistically significant effects on the corruption indicators 
(Andvig, 2002). In addition to the rather obvious simultaneous connection as two 
different expressions of the same breakdown of the communist party organisation, 
the decline of production and the change in norms and values had separate effects 
on subsequent corruption levels through economic mechanisms triggered on after 
the initial policy shock. Let us look at some.  
First, the production decline itself caused corruption. Its effect through the 
intermediary variable of tax collection was obvious. Less clear-cut, but working in 
most sectors experiencing activity decline was what we may call the Schumpeter 
effect: The simultaneous experience of production decline and new, unknown 
institutional rules for operating, implied that many of the traditional activities in 
the centrally planned economies either became impossible or pointless to perform, 
a situation which had to shake the enterprises and public sub-hierarchies away 
from much of their traditional task-solving and rule-abiding transactions. In 
Schumpeter’s famous theory, regular depressions in capitalists economies led to 
shake-ups that stimulated entrepreneurs to look for new, applicable technologies 
as means for economic survival. After a while, a clustering in time of such appli-
cations led to economic revival.  
In the case of the even larger uncertainty of the transition, the shake-ups led to 
search for private personal (and enterprise) economic opportunities in an eco-
nomic environment where agents were uncertain of whether they should stay with 
their tasks, follow bureaucratic rules or engage in friendship games. This uncer-
                                                 
17  Fischer and Sahay (2000: 34). This number as well as the explanation of the production decline outlined 
in the following are controversial. It would make this paper too long to give a balanced overview of the 
competing and complementary explanations, however.  
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tainty often led to the dominance of the economic (survival) mood. Given the ini-
tial positions of many of the agents involved, this gave rise to a large number of 
corrupt transactions. That is the motivation part of the Schumpeter effect.18 Learn-
ing processes were also involved. Since the economic rules to a larger degree 
became questioned, being in flux, more ways to circumvent them were explored. 
Corruption is essentially a rule-breaking activity and in that sense often entrepre-
neurial in spirit. As corruption entrepreneurs discovered new ways to survive or 
become rich by breaking the rules, followers would join and the incidence of cor-
rupt transactions increase.  
While the Schumpeter effect of the production decline and its associated disor-
ganisation and institutional reshuffling mainly operated on corruption as ongoing 
practices, the related Huntington effect, alluded to in the introduction, worked also 
strongly on the public’s perception of the corruption issue. The Huntington effect 
relates corruption in fast-changing, ‘modernising’ societies less to the reshuffling 
of institutions, but rather to the reshuffling of norms. Huntington (1968: 60) viv-
idly describes the effect:  
 
  Corruption in a modernizing society is … in part not so much the result of 
the deviation of behavior from accepted norms as it is the deviance of norms 
from established patterns of behavior. …. the calling into questions of old 
standards … tends to undermine the legitimacy of all standards. The conflict 
between modern and traditional norms opens opportunities for individuals to 
act in ways justified by neither.  
 
This means that the Huntington effect partly includes a situation where the sur-
vival of old personalised behaviour occurs at the same time as new norms for 
public office are introduced, and partly describes an anomie effect caused by 
agents experiencing that two contradictory norms apply to a given situation. The 
                                                 
18  In several multiple equilibrium models of corruption such as Andvig and Moene (1990), widely divergent 
corruption levels are explained as the outcome of the same gain-motivated behaviour. Hence, by applying 
Occam’s razor, the Schumpeter effect may be considered to be an unnecessary detour: Why explain a 
shift towards high corruption levels as a massive transition from task-motivated towards gain-motivated 
behaviour, when the same kind of transition might be explained as two equilibria among gain-motivated 
agents? The reason is simply that it is hard to imagine the low corruption equilibrium to be realistic for a 
population of gain-motivated agents. 
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assumption is that the agents then follow neither and respond by choosing the 
economic gain mode, which may be immoral according to both norm sets.  
While the anomie effect was the same in the socialist transition case, the norm 
effect was different. Here it was new behaviour patterns that would be judged by 
the old, pre-transition norms as corrupt and hence give rise to a perceived increase 
in corruption. Since the OECD ideal allows a much larger scope for market trans-
actions, many established practices would not be corrupt according to the new set 
of rules, so the actual level of corruption could go down while the perceived lev-
els could go up, the opposite development of the one Huntington (1968: 59–72) 
was considering.19 If true, the anomie aspect is likely to have been important since 
they work like certain (internal) punishment. The penal code does not have the 
same effect since corruption is a low risk crime,as pointed out by Rose-Ackerman 
(1978) a long time ago,  
Moral overshooting is an effect closely related to the Huntington effect. It is a 
hypothesis assuming active interaction between the two different norm systems: 
Since the new market economy allows so many new areas for gain-motivated 
actions considered corrupt by the old code, it must also be acceptable according to 
the new business-friendly code to buy and sell bureaucratic and political deci-
sions. Why not?  
Conclusion: The corruption legacy of communist party breakdowns 
Former socialist countries have rather high corruption rates compared to countries 
that had comparable GDP levels before the transition. By constructing tailor-made 
counter-factuals it is possible, however, to bring their corruption levels back to 
normal (Treisman 2002). Some of these counter-factuals, as we argued in the 
introduction, such as the one where the absence of British rule is part of the 
explanation of the high corruption rates in the post-communist countries, are so 
artificial that it is difficult to consider them seriously as explanatory alternatives to 
                                                 
19  Roughly; Huntington discussed the transition from a family-based to a ‘modern’ economy where it was 
essential to make a clear normative distinction between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ for officials in both 
the private and public sectors in modern society. The application of the old family practices in the new 
setting would imply corruption according to Huntington’s definition. Hence an increase. If the old norms 
persist, corruption as perceived by the locals would not increase, exactly the opposite of our case. 
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a study of the policy shock and the process of transition, as focused on here. 
Missing reliable information about the actual pre-transition corruption levels, it is 
difficult to decide for certain whether corruption in fact increased or not as a con-
sequence of legal market expansion and the communist parties’ breakdowns.20 
While certainly not reliable, perceptions about corruption tell a more determinate 
story. Most opinion surveys show that the majority of people who have gone 
through post-communist transition experienced the new society to give rise to 
even more corruption than the one they have left, as indicated by the following 
table:  
 
Table 3: Comparing the perceived corruption effect of the regime change (%) 
 
 Corruption has increased Corruption is the same Corruption is less 
Ukraine 87 11 1 
FR Yugoslavia 81 17 2 
Slovakia 81 15 4 
Hungary  77 20 2 
Russia 73 23 4 
Bulgaria 71 25 3 
Czech Republic 70 24 5 
Belarus 70 25 5 
Croatia 66 28 6 
Romania 58 28 14 
Slovenia 58 28 14 
Poland 52 37 12 
 
Source used: Rose ( 2001). Question asked: ‘By comparison with the former communist regime, 
would you say that the level of corruption and taking bribes has increased?’ The survey was done 
around 1997–98 except for Russia where the questions were raised in 1999–2000. 
 
                                                 
20  See, however, World Bank 2001: Table 1 which indicates that actual corruption appears to have increased 
significantly in fact. 
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When Marx and Polanyi discussed the transition from a ‘natural’ to a market-
based economy, they noted both the backwards-disrupting effects of the growth of 
markets on the old economy, and the painful experience of carrying forwards old 
economic practices and norms about proper economic behaviour into a system 
dominated by market coordination. One of the more disrupting of this kind in the 
post-communist transition was corruption. Whether the increase was mainly per-
ceived or both a perceived and behavioural fact, extensive corruption is an 
important legacy of the post-communist transition.  
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